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CHILDREN'S LAW: Investigatory Detention of Juveniles
in New Mexico: Providing Greater Protection than
Miranda Rights for Children in the Area of Police
Questioning-State of New Mexico v. Javier M.
MARIA E. TOUCHET*
I. INTRODUCTION
In State ofNew Mexico v. JavierM.,' the New Mexico Supreme Court established
new limits on police interrogation of juveniles who are not in custodial interrogation
but are simply being detained for investigatory purposes. The court held that the
New Mexico Children's Code Section on Delinquency2 is not merely a codification
of Miranda3 warnings; but instead, the court concluded that in enacting Section
32A-2-14(C) the Legislature intended to provide juveniles with greater protections
than those provided to adults in the area of police questioning. This Note will
discuss the facts surrounding State v. JavierM., the history of Miranda warnings
and juveniles, the rationale of the Javier M. court, an analysis of its decision, and
finally, the implications that this decision will have on future police questioning of
a juvenile "suspected" of being or "alleged" to be a delinquent child.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about September 17, 1999, Officer Helton and his partner, both of the
Hobbs Police Department, responded to a loud music complaint at an apartment in
Hobbs.4 As the officers approached the building they heard loud music and saw a
woman sitting on the steps. When the woman saw the officers approach, she got up,
headed toward the door saying that the police were there, and went inside the
apartment, shutting the door behind her. The music was turned off, but as the
officers approached the apartment, Officer Helton testified that he could smell
alcohol and marijuana coming from inside the apartment. The officers called for
backup and waited for approximately twenty minutes for someone to answer the
door. When the door to the apartment was finally opened, Officer Helton testified
that he smelled an even stronger odor of alcohol and marijuana and saw several
empty beer cans throughout the apartment. Inside the apartment there were
approximately ten to fifteen individuals. The officers5 entered the apartment and
began separating the individuals that were under eighteen years of age from the

* Class of 2003, University of New Mexico School of Law. I want to thank my faculty advisor, Raquel
Montoya-Lewis, and my Law Review Editor, Allison Crist, for their tremendous guidance throughout this whole
process; my family for their ever present love and support; and Michael Shiller for his love and sense of humor even
when I was cranky.
1. 2001-NMSC-030, 131 N.M. 1, 33 P.3d 1.
2. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-14 (Supp. 1999).
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. Unless otherwise cited, all factual and procedural information is from Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030 IN
2-6, 131 N.M. at
, 33 P.3d at 5-7.
5. The record does not reveal how many officers were present at the scene after Officer Helton and his
partner called for backup.
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adults. The officers determined that all of the individuals who were under the age
of eighteen would be cited for curfew violations and taken home.6
The officers' first contact with the juvenile in question, Javier, occurred in the
living room of the Hobbs apartment. At the time of the incident, Javier was fifteenyears old. Javier did not appear intoxicated nor did he possess any alcoholic
beverages; however, Officer Helton testified that he detected the smell of alcohol on
Javier. The officer asked Javier to step outside of the apartment with him. Once
outside, the officer asked Javier his name, his age, and whether he had consumed
any alcohol that evening. Javier answered the officer's questions and admitted that
he had consumed alcohol that evening. As a result, the officer issued citations: one
for violating the curfew ordinance and one for a minor in possession of alcohol.7 At
no time during the questioning of Javier or the issuing of the citation was he placed
under formal arrest, given Mirandawarnings, or advised of his basic rights pursuant
to Section 32A-2-14(C) of the Children's Code, nor was he asked to waive his
rights.
A petition was filed in Children's Court alleging that Javier had violated Section
60-7B-1(C) of the Liquor Control Act. Javier filed a motion to suppress his
statements admitting his consumption of alcohol, arguing that he had been
questioned prior to receiving his Mirandawarnings and prior to being advised of his
basic rights pursuant to the Children's Code. The children's court ruled that his
Mirandarights had not been violated because Javier was not subject to a custodial
interrogation; therefore, the protections guaranteed by Miranda had not been
triggered. Javier was thereafter found guilty of violating Section 60-7B-1(C) and
was committed to a youth facility for one year.
Javier appealed his conviction for possession of alcoholic beverages to the court
of appeals arguing that NMSA 1978, Section 32A-2-14 (1993) of the Children's
Code requires that before a police officer questions or interrogates a child suspected
of committing delinquent acts, the police must read the child his constitutional rights
and "receive a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver." The court of appeals
upheld the ruling of the children's court, holding there was no violation of the
child's Miranda rights because he was never in custody and never subject to a
custodial interrogation.8 The court further rejected Javier's argument that Section
32A-2-14(C) requires that a child be given Mirandawarnings even if the child is not
in custody or is not under arrest.9 The court of appeals held that Section 32A-2-14
"is really nothing more than a codification of Miranda...and thus, there is no
requirement that the child be given Miranda warnings when the police initiate
contact and are trying to determine if there has been a violation of law."1°

6. In September of 1999, when the incident occurred, the Hobbs Police were still enforcing the Hobbs
curfew statute. That curfew has since been deemed unconstitutional. See ACLU v. City of Albuquerque, 128 N.M.

315, 992 P.2d 866 (1999).
7. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-7B-1 (C) (Supp. 2001) ("It is a violation of the Liquor Control Act for aminor...to
possess or permit himself to be served with alcoholic beverages.").
8. JavierM., 2001-NMSC-030

9. Id.
10. Id.131 N.M. at
20, 2000)).

6, 131 N.M. at_,

33 P.3d at6.

, 33 P.3d at 7 (quoting State v. Javier M., No. 21,568, slip op. at 2 (Ct. App. Sept.
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Javier sought a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of New Mexico, arguing
first that the Children's Code does in fact require that a child be provided Miranda
warnings before the police ask a child any questions from which information could
be obtained to charge and incarcerate him." In the alternative, Javier argued that,
even if the Children's Code does not afford rights greater than those under Miranda,
his statements still should have been suppressed, because he was subject to2 a
custodial interrogation without first being informed of his constitutional rights.'
The New Mexico Supreme Court held that under a pure Miranda analysis,
Javier's rights had not been violated because he was not in a custodial
interrogation.' 3 The court, however, disagreed with the holding of the court of
appeals, which characterized Section 32A-2-14(C) as a mere codification of
Miranda. Instead, the supreme court reasoned that the Legislature, in enacting
Section 32A-2-14(C), had intended to provide juveniles with even greater
protections than those that are afforded to adults in the area of police questioning.
Therefore, the court held that under the Children's Code any child who "is detained
or seized and suspected of wrongdoing must be advised of his or her right to remain
'4
silent and.. .if the child waives that right, anything said can be used against them."'
The court determined that Javier had been subject to an investigatory detention
without first being advised that he was under no obligation to answer the officer's
questions, and therefore, his statements should have been suppressed pursuant to
Section 32A-2-14(D)."5 As a result, Javier's conviction was reversed.
HI. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court of New Mexico in this case was asked to evaluate the
admissibility of a juvenile's statements made in response to police questioning. Any
analysis of this type must begin with the United States Supreme Court decision in
Miranda v. Arizona.16 Only by first working through the minimum constitutional
rights afforded by that decision could the. New Mexico Supreme Court move to an
interpretation of Section 32A-2-14 of the Children's Code to determine what
additional protections, if any, are available to a juvenile under that statute."'
A. ConstitutionalProtectionsAfforded under the MirandaDecision
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution mandates, "No person
shall be...compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself....... In
1966, the United States Supreme Court in Miranda set out to establish safeguards
to protect the constitutional rights of suspects in custodial interrogations and set the
procedural guidelines for courts to follow to determine whether a confession is
presumed voluntary. In Miranda,the Supreme Court disposed of the prior case-by-

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

33 P.3d at 7.
Id. 7, 131N.M. at _,
Id.
Id. 23, 131 N.M. at -,33 P.3d at 11-12.
Id. 48, 131 N.M. at
, 33 P.3d at 20.
Id.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
State v. JavierM., 2001-NMSC-030 11, 131 N.M. at,
U.S. CONST. amend. V.

33 P.3d at 8.
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case examination of the determination of whether a confession was made voluntarily
in favor of set guidelines to ensure that a suspect's Fifth Amendment protection
against self-incrimination had been preserved. 9
The Supreme Court in Miranda granted certiorari with the expressed goal of
"giv[ing] concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts
to follow."2 The Court held that the prosecution must demonstrate the use of
procedural safeguards in a custodial interrogation in order to introduce statements
made by a defendant. 2' The Court stated that the procedural safeguards must be
followed "unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons
of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it."'22 In
this way, the Court clarified that the Miranda guidelines are not mandated by the
Constitution.23
The Constitution only speaks to prohibiting practices and procedures that compel
individuals to incriminate themselves. Consequently, the Fifth Amendment does not
prohibit the government from asking questions nor does it prohibit an individual
from voluntarily offering incriminating statements. 24 The Miranda Court
acknowledged, however, that the asking of questions by a law enforcement agent is
so inherently coercive that any answer arrived at during such interrogation is
innately "compelled" under the Fifth Amendment.25 At the root of this
acknowledgement is the idea of custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation
occurs when "[an individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody,
surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion ...
cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak. '26 Recognizing the compelling
pressures present during police interrogations, the Supreme Court established
guidelines to advise suspects of their Fifth Amendment rights prior to any
questioning. 21

19. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
20. Id. at 441-42.
21. Id. at 444. The following procedural safeguards were provided by the Court:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of
these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however,
he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an
attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and
indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question
him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements
on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until
he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
Id.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id. at 467.
See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984).
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 467-68.
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B. The Extension of ConstitutionalProtectionsto Juveniles by the Courts
In the early years of the juvenile courts, the prevailing belief was that children are
less culpable for their actions than adults." The established doctrine was the parens
patriaemodel, which views children as within the special protection, and under the
control of, the State. 29 This doctrine has been described as both a set of suggestions
for how to organize juvenile courts and a statement of the ideology upon which the
courts are based. 30 The organizational model encouraged informal, personal
handling of cases based upon the specific juvenile's needs, emphasizing the
individual needs of the juvenile instead of simply concentrating on the criminal
behavior. 3' The resulting management of the juveniles was supposed to be centered
on treatment and rehabilitation instead of incarceration. 2 The parallel ideology was
that children do not possess the necessary understanding or cognition to control their
actions, and therefore the court must act as a parent to decide what is in the best
interest of the child.33
The juvenile courts, unlike the adult criminal courts, focused on individualized
treatment and the welfare and best interest of the child and rejected the punishment
model and strict procedure of adult courts. 4 Social philosophy dictated that the state
not ask "whether the child was guilty or innocent, but what is he, how has he
become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of
the state to save him from a downward career? ' 35 However, juveniles accused of
crimes were afforded no due process protections in these courts.36 According to the
reformers, the7 state did not deprive the child of any rights because the child did not
3
possess any.
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court dramatically changed the character of
the juvenile justice system and extended the rights provided to adults in Mirandato
children.3" This extension was a move away from the parens patriae model and
towards giving children heightened procedural safeguards.39 Child offenders have
been seen as increasingly dangerous, and the proceedings against them have been
made increasingly adversarial and punitive. 40 Therefore, the Court in In re Gault
recognized that in this day and age a child needs special procedural protections "to

28. See Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of Transfer to
Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 375-76 (1998).
29. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1137 (7th ed. 1999).
30. See Michael Sosin, Parens Patriae and Dispositions in Juvenile Courts, Discussion Papers (University
of Wisconsin-Madison Institute for Research on Poverty, June 1978).
31. Id.
at 1-2.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Klein, supra note 28, at 376-77.
35. In re Gault, 387 U.S. i, 15 (1967) (quoting Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104,
119-20 (1909)).
36. See Klein, supra note 28, at 377.
37. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 17.
38. Id. at 55 (rejecting the parens patriae model as inaccurate and ineffective).
39. Id. at 15-19.
40. Id. at 36 ("A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and
subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution.").
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cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, [and] to insist
upon the regularity of the proceedings."'
Later the Supreme Court reiterated the crucial role of providing procedural
safeguards to children in police custody but refused to give juveniles greater
protections than those extended to adults.4 In Fare,the Court held that the child's
request to speak with his probation officer did not invoke either his right to remain
silent or his right to counsel.43 The Court stated unequivocally that the validity of a
juvenile's waiver must be determined by the totality of the circumstances: "This
totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there has
been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved." In addition, three
other landmark decisions refused to extend greater constitutional rights than were
then afforded adults.45
C. The Legislative Response
Legislatures in many jurisdictions responded to Miranda and In re Gault by
implementing new legislation aimed at the administration of juvenile justice. For
federal prosecutions, Congress passed the Federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act of 1974.' This legislation served as a model for several states'
juvenile legislation. Section 5033 of the 1974 Act provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a juvenile is taken into custody for an alleged act of juvenile
delinquency, the arresting officer shall immediately advise such juvenile of his
legal rights, in language comprehensive to a juvenile, and shall immediately
notify the Attorney General and thejuvenile's parents, guardian, or custodian of
such custody. The arresting officer shall also notify the parents, guardian, or
custodian of the rights of the juvenile and of the nature of the alleged offense.47
New Mexico acknowledged the need to provide procedural protections to
juveniles with the enactment of its Children's Code in 1972.48 That first version of
the Children's Code stated, "an extra-judicial statement that could be
constitutionally inadmissible in a criminal matter shall not be received in evidence
over objection [in Children's court proceedings]." That provision was changed to
its present language, "a child is entitled to the same basic rights as an adult, except
as otherwise provided...," in the 1981 version of what is now the Children's Code.49

41. Id.

42. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
43. Id. at 728.
44. Id. at 725.
45. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (holding that juveniles need not be given the option of
ajury trial in delinquency proceedings); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (discussing that although preventive
detention has been held unconstitutional, it is constitutionally acceptable when applied to children); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that warrantless search ofjuvenile's purse by school officials without probable
cause was constitutionally acceptable when applied to juveniles).
46. Pub. L. No. 93-415, § 5033, 88 Stat. 1109, 1135 (1974).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (1994).
48. 1972 N.M. LAWS ch. 97, § 25 (later compiled as N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-27(C)(1) (1972, repealed
1981)).
49. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-27(A) (1981).
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Section 32A-2-14 of the current New Mexico Children's Code states in pertinent
part:
(A) A child subject to the provisions of the Delinquency Act [this article] is
entitled to the same basic rights as an adult, except as otherwise provided in the
Children's Code [this chapter]....
(C) No person subject to the provisions of the Delinquency Act who is alleged
or suspected of being a delinquent child shall be interrogated or questioned
without first advising the child of the child's constitutional rights and securing
a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver.
(D) Before any statement or confession may be introduced at a trial or hearing
when a child is alleged to be a delinquent child, the state shall prove that the
statement or confession offered in evidence was elicited only after a knowing,
intelligent and voluntary waiver of the child's rights was obtained.
(E) In determining whether the child knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
waived the child's rights, the court shall consider the following factors:
(1) the age and education of the respondent;
(2) whether or not the respondent is in custody;
(3) the manner in which the respondent was advised of his rights;
(4) the length of the questioning and circumstances under which the
respondent was questioned;
(5) the condition of the quarters where the respondent was being kept at
the time he was questioned;
(6) the time of day and the treatment of the respondent at the time that he
was questioned;
(7) the mental and physical condition of the respondent at the time that he
was questioned; and
(8) whether or not the respondent had the counsel of an attorney, friends
or relatives at the time of being questioned.5"
The juvenile codes of most states have adopted the Fare approach applying a
totality-of-circumstances test to judicial assessments of juvenile waiver and have not
afforded juveniles greater procedural protections than Miranda.5' Only a minority
of states has instituted greater protections to juveniles, mandating that juveniles have
the opportunity to consult with a parent, guardian, attorney, or other "interested
adult."52 Most states have rejected this approach because it is viewed as merely
prophylactic and not mandated by either federal law or state constitutions." Critics
of this approach have stated that society's need to solve crimes and protect the

50. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-14 (Supp. 1999)
51. For a recent survey of states that have adopted the totality approach, see Trey Meyer, Comment, Testing
the Validity of Confessions and Waivers of the Self-IncriminationPrivilege in Juvenile Courts, 47 U. KAN. L. REV.
1035, 1072 n.299 (1999).
52. Penelope Alysse Brobst, Note, The Court Giveth and the Court Taketh Away: State v.
Fernandez-ReturningLouisiana's Children to an Adult Standard,60 LA. L. REv. 605, 614 n.81 (2000) (noting
that at least thirteen states have adopted the per se approach, including Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana,
Iowa, Massachusetts, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia).
53. David T. Huang, Note, "Less UnequalFooting':State Courts' PerSe Rules forJuvenile Waivers During
Interrogationsand the Casefor Their Implementation, 86 CORNELL L REv. 437, 465 (2001).
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public "outweighs the exclusion of a juvenile's confession on the basis of youth
alone" and the per se rule undervalues this objective."
IV. COURT'S RATIONALE
A. The Child Was Not under CustodialInterrogation
Javier argued that he was subject to a custodial interrogation because he was not
allowed to leave until he was released to a parent or guardian, there were many
police officers present at the scene, the underage children were separated from the
adults, and Officer Helton knew that when questioning Javier he would likely elicit
incriminating responses from him." The court rejected this position, instead siding
with the State's contention that the child was not subject to a custodial interrogation
but was simply subject to a brief investigatory detention.56
The court distinguished between a custodial interrogation and an investigatory
detention. The court acknowledged that freedom to leave is only one element of a
custodial interrogation57 but also recognized that it is really the combination of the
lack of freedom to leave together with isolation that implicates the Fifth Amendment
protections.5 Investigatory detentions, on the other hand, implicate the Fourth
Amendment protections and are "of limited scope and duration, are generally public,
temporary, and substantially less coercive than custodial interrogations."59
Fifth Amendment protections are therefore not triggered with investigatory
detentions in the same way as with custodial interrogations.' Under the Fourth
Amendment, more latitude is afforded to police officers who are investigating
suspicious behaviors. 6' For example, a traffic stop in order to investigate a traffic
violation is admissible under the Fourth Amendment.62 These traffic stops are
considered investigatory detentions "because the stop is presumptively temporary
and brief," as contrasted with the intrusive nature of a station house interrogation,
which rises to the level of custodial interrogation because of the inherently coercive
nature of such a detention.63
The New Mexico Supreme Court looked to the reasoning in State v. Taylor64
discussing how an investigatory detention may rise to the level of a custodial
interrogation. "[A]n officer's suspicions may broaden during an investigatory stop
to include matters unrelated to the initial reason for the stop" and an officer may

54. Ann Leslie Bailey, Note, Waiver of Miranda Rights by Juveniles: Is ParentalPresence a Necessary
Safeguard?,21 J. FAM. L 725, 730 (1983).
55. State v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030

17, 131 N.M. at-,

33 P.3d 1, 9.

56. Id.IN20-23, 131 N.M. at-_, 33 P.3d at 10-12.
57. Id. 18, 131 N.M. at-, 33 P.3d at 9-10.
58. Id.
59. Id. 19, 131 N.M. at - 33 P.3d at 10. Fourth Amendment protections are provided to guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
60. JavierM. 19, 131 N.M. at _, 33 P.3d at 10; see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984)
(holding that because an initial stop of respondent's vehicle did not, by itself, render respondent in custody,
respondent was not entitled to constitutional rights).
61. JavierM., 2001-NMSC-030 19, 131 N.M. at-_, 33 P.3d at 10.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 126 N.M. 569, 973 P.2d 246 (Ct. App. 1999), cert denied, 126 N.M. 534, 972 P.2d 353 (1999).
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pursue those matters if they "cause the officer reasonable suspicion."65 But, "any
questioning and searching for weapons during a stop made to investigate unrelated
matters must be based on specific, articulable facts, not unsupported intuitions or
inarticulate hunches." 66
The court agreed with Javier's contention that he was not free to leave at the time
Officer Helton questioned him but also noted the characteristics that implicated an
67
investigatory detention: the questioning was temporary, non-coercive, and public.
Analogous to a traffic stop, Officer Helton reasonably suspected that Javier had
committed a crime. These suspicions were based upon "specific, articulable facts":
Javier was present in the apartment where it appeared that the occupants were
attempting to conceal a crime, and the officer smelled alcohol and marijuana in the
apartment and alcohol on the child.68
Ultimately the court found that Javier's detention did not rise to the level of
custodial interrogation.69 The court pointed to facts that prevented the questioning
from rising to that level: Javier was not overpowered by police presence, only a
short period of time elapsed between the initial contact and the issuance of the
citation, he was never informed that his detention would not be temporary, the
specific reasoning for detaining him was not because he was in custody but because
under the curfew ordinance the officers were required to assume a caretaker role,
and finally, because the questioning was sufficiently public.7" Therefore, the court
found that, even though Javier was not free to leave, his questioning did not
constitute a custodial interrogation. They ultimately held that under a pure
constitutional analysis, the officer was not required to "Mirandize" the child before
questioning him.7'
B. The Legislature Intended to Provide GreaterStatutory Protectionto Children
than Miranda with Respect to the Admissibility of a Child's Statement
The New Mexico Supreme Court overruled the court of appeals, which held that
in passing Section 32A-2-14 the Legislature meant to simply codify the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Miranda.By looking at the plain language of the
statute, the court concluded that a child need not be subject to custodial interrogation
in order to trigger an advisement of constitutional rights prior to police
questioning. The court looked to the language used by the Legislature and noted
that instead of using Miranda triggering terms such as "custody" or "custodial
interrogation," the Legislature used much broader terms such as "alleged,"
"suspected," "interrogated," and "questioned. ' 73 Because of the inclusion of those
broader terms, the court concluded that the Legislature intended to provide
protection to children outside of the narrow constraints of a custodial interrogation.
65. Id. at 576, 973 P.2d at 253.
66. Id.
67. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030
68. Id. J20, 131 N.M. at
69. Id. 23, 131 N.M. at

70. Id. Ig21-23, 131 N.M. at _
71. Id.
72. Id.

23, 131 N.M. at
29, 131 N.M. at

20-23, 131 N.M. at -, 33 P.3d at 10-12.

33 P.3dat 10-11.
,33P.3dat 11-12.

,33 P.3d at 11-12.

,33 P.3d at 12.
33 P.3d at 13.

73. Id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-14(C) (Supp. 1999)).
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Looking at the statute as a whole, the court also acknowledged that Subsection
(E) further supported the conclusion that custodial interrogation is not a prerequisite
to warning under the statute.74 Subsection (E)(2) notes that one of the factors to
consider whether or not a child has voluntarily waived his rights is "whether or not
the child is in custody." Also, "the length of the questioning and circumstances
under which the child was questioned" must be considered. 75 The court reasoned
that the Legislature would not have included these predicates if they had meant to
simply codify Miranda.
Further evidence of the legislative intent was found in the history and evolution
of Section 32A-2-14. The 1972 version of the Code specifically included the term
"custody" when triggering a child's constitutional rights.76 When the statute was
revised in 1981, however, the term "custody" was removed.77 Instead, in 1981 the
Legislature added provision (C), stating, "No person subject to the provisions of the
Delinquency Act who is alleged or suspected of being a delinquent child shall be
interrogated or questioned without first advising the child of the child's
' 78
constitutional rights and securing a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver.
The State argued that the term "custody" was unnecessary because in the 1981
revision and the current version of the Code, the Legislature also included
Subsection (A), which stated, "A child subject to the provisions of the Delinquency
Act...is entitled to the same basic rights as an adult, except as otherwise provided in
the Children's Code.... " The State reasoned that because of the language in
Subsection (A) no explicit reference to "custody" was necessary in Subsection (C).8"
The court rejected the State's reasoning, however, and instead saw the inclusion
of Subsection (C) as evidence against the proposition that the Code was merely a
codification of Miranda." The court rejected the State's reading of the statute
because it would render Subsection (C) superfluous. The court instead found that
Subsection (C) was the Legislature exercising its "except as otherwise provided"
authority under Subsection (A), and accordingly held that Section 32A-2-14 was not
merely a codification of Mirandabut instead the Legislature provided children with
greater statutory protection than those constitutionally mandated. 2
C. Triggeringof Statutory Protection during an Investigatory Detention
The court looked to the language of the Children's Code to determine when the
statutory protections are triggered. The statute states that as a prerequisite to
requiring that a child be advised of his or her rights, the child must be either
"suspected" or "alleged" of being a delinquent child. 3 "Alleged" is prompted after

74. Id. 30, 131 N.M. at

33 P.3d at 14.

75. Id.

76.
77.
1993)).
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. 31, 131 N.M. at __,33 P.3d at 14 (citing 1972 N.M. Laws, ch. 97 § 25(A) (repealed 1981)).
Id. (citing 1981 N.M. LAws ch. 36, § 21 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-27 (1978) (repealed
Id.
Id. 31, 131 N.M. at .. , 33 P.3d at 14-15 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-14(A) (Supp. 1999)).
33 P.3d at 15.
Id. 31, 131 N.M. at.,
,33P.3dat 15.
Id. 32, 131 N.M. at
Id.
Id. 34, 131 N.M. at .. , 33 P.3d at 16 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-14(C)(Supp. 1999)).
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formal charges have been filed against a child in the Children's Court; however, it
was the term "suspected" that was of significance in this case.'
The court rejected the propositions by both the State and by Javier as to when the
statutory protections are triggered and instead instituted its own standard." Javier
argued that as soon as an officer asks questions likely to lead to an incriminating
response, the protections of Section 32A-2-14 attach. 6 The State countered by
arguing that this standard would be impractical and would affect police officers'
ability to adequately investigate crimes; therefore, the only adequate standard for the
triggering of the statutory protections would be custodial interrogation. 7 The court,
however, disagreed with both propositions and instead provided a standard that falls
between the two extremes. The court found that the term "suspected" triggered the
statutory protections when a child is "imagined to be engaged in some
wrongdoing."88
In addition, the New Mexico Supreme Court also found that the determination of
whether a child is "suspected" of a wrongdoing should be measured by an objective
standard instead of a subjective standard.89 Use of a subjective standard in the
evaluation of an officer's intentions has been shown to be problematic at a minimum
and subject to abuses at a maximum.'
The State argued that all of the questioning of Javier in this case, including the
officer's questions about whether he had been drinking, were merely "threshold
inquiries" not covered by Section 32A-2-14. The New Mexico Supreme Court has
held that procedural protections do not apply to statements children "volunteered"
or statements that come out as answers to "threshold questions."'" New Mexico case
law and legislative history illustrate, however, that the "threshold inquiry" is limited
in scope to determining only a subject's identity and age.92 Therefore, the court held
that the statute does not require that officers give constitutional rights prior to: "(1)
questions pertaining to a child's age or identity; (2) general on-the-scene
questioning; or (3) volunteered statements made by the child." 93 Instead, the statute
protects children from statements made during an investigatory detention "in
response to a police officer's questioning that could not be mere administrative
questions and that is intended to confirm or dispel the officer's suspicions that the
child is or has committed a delinquent act." 94 Therefore, because Javier had been
subject to an investigatory detention, Section 32A-2-14(C) required that he be
advised of his "constitutional rights" prior to any questioning.95

84. Id.
85. Id. 33, 131 N.M. at
33 P.3d at 16.
86. Id. 33, 131 N.M. at
33 P.3d at 15.
87. Id. 33, 131 N.M. at,
33 P.3dat 15-16.
88. Id. 34, 131 N.M. at
33 P.3d at 16.
89. Id. 35, 131 N.M. at
33 P.3d at 16.
90. Id.
91. Id. 940, 131 N.M. at,
33 P.3d at 18; see also State v. Doe, 100 N.M. 579, 673 P.2d 1312 (1984).
92. Id.; see also State v. Taylor, 126 N.M. 569,973 P.2d 246 (1999) (holding that for adults, any questioning
beyond the scope of the routine checking of license and registration must be supported by at least reasonable
suspicion).
93. JavierM., 2001-NMSC-030 40, 131 N.M. at_., 33 P.3d at 18.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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D. Definition of the Scope of the "ConstitutionalRights" that a Child Must Be
Advised of under Section 32A-2-14(C)
The court in Javier M. held that children who are subject to an investigatory
detention are statutorily entitled to be warned of their right to remain silent and that
anything said can be used against them. This holding does not require that a child
be advised of the full rights enumerated in Mirandawhen subject to an investigatory
detention." Instead, the court held that in the absence of a custodial interrogation,
the general right to receive Mirandarights does not apply.9" Individuals, therefore,
do not have the right to have an attorney present during investigatory detentions that
never rise to the level of custodial interrogations.
Even though children are not entitled to full Miranda rights under the
circumstances of an investigatory detention, the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination still attaches.98 Therefore, the court interpreted the enactment of
Section 32A-2-14(C) as providing juveniles with a newly created statutory right, not
the codification of a constitutional mandate." The Children's Code shifts the burden
to law enforcement to make a child aware of the fact that during an investigatory
detention, a child is under no obligation to answer an officer's questions. Therefore,
the court held that "the term 'constitutional rights' in Subsection (C).. .refers to the
right to remain silent."'"
V. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
A. GreaterProtectionsto Juveniles
The prevailing thought is that children do not possess the maturity and cognitive
abilities to make Miranda warnings an adequate protection against their potential
waiver of constitutional rights.' The New Mexico Legislature's chosen protective
approach for juveniles was Section 32A-2-14. Sub-section (F) prohibits the
admission of statements made by children under the age of thirteen in any
circumstance. 2 It also imposes a legal presumption that all statements made by
thirteen- and fourteen-year-olds are inadmissible.0 3 Given this context, it was
perfectly reasonable for the New Mexico Supreme Court to reason that the
Legislature in Subsections (C) and (D) intended to require that all statements made
by fifteen-year-olds and up be carefully evaluated under the factors articulated in

96. Id. 41, 131 N.M. at _,33 P.3d at 18.
33 P.3d at 18.
97. Id. 42, 131 N.M. at
33 P.3dat 18.
98. Id. 43, 131 N.M. at
99. Id.
,33 P.3d at 20.
100. Id. 47, 131 N.M. at
101. See Huang, supra note 53, at 438 (discussing that "Miranda warnings do not adequately protect children
from waiving their constitutional rights unwittingly during custodial interrogations because of juveniles' immaturity,
lack of comprehension, and special status of the justice system").
102. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-14(F) (Supp. 1999) ("Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary,
no confessions, statements or admissions may be introduced against a child under the age of thirteen years on the
allegations of the petition.").
103. Id. ("There is a rebuttable presumption that any confessions, statements or admissions made by a child
thirteen or fourteen years old to a person in a position of authority are inadmissible.").
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Subsection (E) (which clearly goes well beyond the call of Miranda) before
admission in delinquency proceedings.
The court saw Section 32A-2-14 as New Mexico's response to the reality that
children are different and that "[t]he immaturity of youth requires that their rights
be even more closely guarded than those of adults."'"14 This decision defined the
greater statutory protections afforded to children in a manner consistent with the
statute's purpose. Prior to State v. JavierM., children in New Mexico were afforded
the same rights as adults in the area of police questioning. Thus, juveniles were not
informed of their right to remain silent until they were subject to a custodial
interrogation. But as the opinion noted, "a child who is subject to an investigatory
detention may feel pressures similar to those experienced by adults during custodial
interrogation."'05
The Legislature declared its intent to hold children accountable for their actions
"to the extent of the child's age, education, mental and physical condition,
background and all other relevant factors ......
' This decision was consistent with
the Legislature's intent in passing the Children's Code.
B. PotentialProblems of the JavierM. Test
The court rejected Javier'sproposed test for when to trigger the rights generated
in Section 32A-2-14. Javierproposed the test of "whether the questioning was likely
to elicit an incriminating response." Justice Pamela Minzner's concurring opinion
argues that Javier'stest captures the legislative intent in enacting Section 32A-214(C) more accurately than the "investigatory-detention" test instituted by the
majority.' 7 A test of whether a child was subject to an investigatory detention
requires a subjective inquiry into the mind of law enforcement officers and may
prove difficult to analyze in less factually clear cases in the future. Application of
Javier's test would have provided objective proof of the officer's subjective state of
mind, "that is, whether he or she suspects that the Child was delinquent."' 01 8 Instead,
the court applied a test with a strong subjective component that may not prove easy
in the practical application of law enforcement.
C. Is This a Return to the ParensPatriaeModel?
State ofNew Mexico v. JavierM. appears to be a return to the philosophy that a
child does not possess the necessary understanding or cognition to control his or her
actions, and therefore the courts must act as a parent to decide what is in the best
interest of the child. It appears that the central purpose of this opinion is to ensure
that juvenile defendants are not coerced during interrogations and that they fully
understand their rights and the consequences of the decision to answer a police
officer's questions.

104. Elizabeth J. Maykut, Who Is Advising Our Children: Custodial Interrogation of Juveniles in Florida,
21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1345, 1347 (1994).
105. JavierM., 2001-NMSC-030 37, 131 N.M. at-, 33 P.3d at 17.
106. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-2(A) (Supp. 1999).
107. JavierM., 2001-NMSC-030 52, 131 N.M. at
,33 P.3d at 21.
108. Id. (Minzner, J., concurring).
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With a move back towards the philosophy of parens patriae, the child in the
justice system is not "considered an enemy of the society but society's child who
needs understanding, guidance and protection. The goals of the program are
°
rehabilitation and protection from the social conditions that lead to crime.""' As a
result, the goal of the children's court becomes one of sensitivity, understanding,
guidance, and protection instead of criminal culpability and determination of guilt
or innocence." 0 This opinion may therefore signal a return to the model of greater
sensitivity to juveniles in the court system with the new addition of increased
procedural protections. This differs from the early origins of the juvenile justice
system in which the state was seen as parent but children were not afforded
procedural protections because they were not considered to possess any such rights
capable of protection.
Criticism of the approach of providing additional procedural protections to
juveniles does exist, however. The experiences of Georgia, Pennsylvania, and
Louisiana are examples of three states that had instituted greater protections to
juveniles through a judicially-created per se rule instead of the "totality-ofcircumstances" approach. Each state, however, eventually abandoned that approach
because of the fear that those rules allow guilty offenders to escape punishment
because of procedural technicalities."' New Mexico's institution of this judiciallycreated rule seems to send the message that any price society must pay for the
application of this rule is outweighed by the assurances that any waivers of
"constitutional rights" by juveniles in the area of police questioning will be the
product of a truly informed and free choice.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS DECISION
As a result of the JavierM. decision, any child who is detained or seized, is
suspected of any wrongdoing, and is subject to an investigatory detention must be
advised of his or her right to remain silent, but if that child waives that right
anything can be used against him or her. If a child is not advised of his or her right
to remain silent or warned of the consequences of such a waiver, any statement or
confession made as a result of a detention or seizure will be deemed inadmissible
in a delinquency hearing. Therefore, the major implications of this decision will be
felt in the law enforcement field. This decision requires that officers advise any
child, who they have a reasonable suspicion to detain, of his or her constitutional
rights under Section 32A-2-14 prior to any questioning. 1 2 Whether or not the child
is suspected of delinquent activity and therefore entitled to the statutory protections
will be evaluated by an objective standard.' 13 Officers, however, are not required to
provide the juvenile with his or her constitutional rights whenever an officer asks
any question likely to elicit an incriminating response." 4 In addition, the statute's

109. Joel F. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965
WIs. L. REV. 7,10.
110. Id.
111. See Huang, supra note 53, at 456.
112. See Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030 38, 131 N.M. at-.., 33 P.3d at 17.
, 33 P.3d at 16.
113. Id. 35, 131 N.M. at
33 P.3dat 17.
114. Id. 39, 131 N.M. at
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protections do not apply when a child, who is not subject to an investigatory
detention, answers general on-the-scene questions or when the child offers a
voluntary statement." 5
The test instituted by the court may not be easy for police officers to apply.
Problems may arise for law enforcement officers in making the determination of
when to give Miranda rights and when providing those rights is not required.
Consequently, police may err on the side of providing juveniles with their Miranda
rights instead of risking the suppression of the statements in court. This opinion
certainly leaves open questions of whether juveniles are under an investigatory
detention because no bright-line objective-standard test has been created.
On appearance, it may seem that application of this opinion will make police
officers' jobs more difficult. Some may fear that application of this increased
procedural protection for juveniles will result in hampered police investigations.
This debate over juvenile waivers may resurrect many of the same debates that were
6 At that
made after the decision in Miranda."1
time, the law enforcement community
decried the decision, arguing that it would greatly increase the number of guilty
criminals who would go free." 7 Far from crippling prosecutions, however, Miranda
has aided police officers in carrying out their duties while at the same time avoiding
charges that they violated a defendant's constitutional rights." 8
In function, this rule may increase the administrative burden on police to secure
a knowing, informed waiver prior to a juvenile's investigatory detention. On the
other hand, conserving judicial resources by providing an analytical framework to
assess juvenile waivers may offset any increase in financial burden on law
enforcement.
Depending on the application of this decision, it may increase the likelihood of
collateral litigation. It may lead to greater motions to suppress statements made by
juveniles in police investigations. Law enforcement officers may now have a higher
burden of proof to show they obtained adequate waiver of rights prior to obtaining
any statements by juveniles. It may now become more difficult to get statements by
juveniles admitted into evidence. On the other hand, statements by juveniles given
in an investigatory-detention setting, after having been read constitutional rights,
may be more likely to be admitted into evidence because of the added procedural
safeguards provided to juveniles. A final consequence is that courts may be more
likely to exclude truly voluntary confessions solely because of procedural
noncompliance.
VII. CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Supreme Court in State v. Javier M. sent a clear message
providing juveniles greater procedural protections than Mirandain the area of police
questioning. This opinion sends the message that any potential impositions placed
upon the juvenile justice system as a result of this rule are outweighed by the
115. Id. 40, 131 N.M. at-, 33 P.3dat 17-18.
116. Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda, 85 CORNELL L. REV 883, 894-903 (2000)
(discussing negative reactions to the Miranda decision).
117. See id.
118. Seeid.
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probability that this rule will provide the juvenile justice system and society with the
assurance that any juvenile waiver of constitutional rights is truly the product of an
informed and free choice. The Javier M. court, however, did not create a clear
bright-line test for when a child is subject to an investigatory detention and
consequently provided the added procedural safeguards. Therefore, the door has
been left open for the application of this rule in future cases. Only time will tell the
practical implications of this decision.

